The From address can match yours exactly
A scammer doesn't need a lookalike domain to impersonate your company. They can put your actual company domain in the From address. Like a return address written on an envelope, that field can contain an address the sender doesn't own.
If your company uses billing@acme.example, a forged invoice could show that very same address. Even a customer who expands the sender details may see the correct domain after the @ sign. A familiar address alone doesn't establish who sent the message. We'll use the fictional domain acme.example throughout this article.
Ask the receiving service to reject spoofed email
You can ask Gmail and other services your customers use to reject messages that fail authentication for your company's From domain. DMARC is how you communicate that request to the server receiving the email.
A notice warns your customers. Use DMARC to ask their mail servers to reject email that spoofs your domain.
A warning on your website can help a customer question a suspicious invoice. But they may never visit the site before opening it, and publishing a notice doesn't put a policy into Gmail's authentication process. Your readers need advice; their mail servers need a domain policy they can check.
Put the request in your domain's DNS
The receiving server looks in DNS. For a company using acme.example, the DMARC policy goes in a TXT record named _dmarc.acme.example. In a real setup, replace acme.example with your company's domain.
Within that record, p=reject asks receivers to reject messages that use the domain in From and fail DMARC. This gives the receiver a handling request it can consult while processing mail. Google's DMARC setup guidance ↗
The receiving service makes the final decision, considering other security information and how the message arrived. Reject doesn't guarantee rejection of every failure or inbox placement for messages that pass. How receivers apply DMARC policy ↗ Before asking for rejection, you need to check that your own legitimate email authenticates correctly.
Make your legitimate email verifiable
Your regular sending services need to provide evidence that receivers can verify. Publish authorized sending-server information in SPF and the public keys used to check email signatures in DKIM. Each service also needs to be configured to apply that authentication to the messages it sends.
DMARC passes if SPF or DKIM passes and that method's authenticated domain aligns with the domain in From. Either method can satisfy the check. Authentication using only a provider's unrelated domain isn't enough: it needs that connection to your company's From domain.
Look beyond employee email. Marketing newsletters, invoices, CRM, and automated notifications may all use company addresses. Ask the people responsible which services they use, enable the appropriate company-domain authentication, and check messages sent through the actual workflows. A missing legitimate sender can turn a stricter policy into a missed customer invoice.
Don't apply reject across staff email domains by default
Forwarding and mailing lists can break authentication on legitimate mail. RFC 9989 advises against reject for domains whose users may post to Internet mailing lists, so assess that use and its impact separately for everyday staff email. A domain publishing reject must also use valid DKIM signatures rather than relying on SPF alone. What to check before choosing a policy · RFC guidance on indirect mail ↗
Find sending servers in Gmail's reports
An inventory is a good start, but it's easy to miss an old newsletter account or an automated tool another team uses. DMARC aggregate reports, also called RUA reports, help you find servers using your domain.
Gmail can report the sending servers, message counts, and authentication results it observed for messages with your domain in From. Your company doesn't have to use Gmail or Google Workspace. Gmail is the receiving service in this example, reporting on email that reached its users. Google's guide to DMARC reports ↗
Compare those sources with the services your company actually uses. You can find legitimate senders that need a configuration fix and unfamiliar sources that need investigation. An unknown server or failed check isn't, by itself, proof of an attack.
You collect reports that receiving services produce after reporting is set up. This doesn't retrieve past email or cover all traffic everywhere: you see what reporting receivers observed. Reports are usually daily summaries, not live attack alerts.
Add a reporting address with rua
The rua field in your DMARC record tells receivers where to send aggregate reports. If your domain has no DMARC record yet, you can start with p=none to observe sending activity without requesting rejection.
_dmarc.acme.example TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@acme.example"Replace acme.example with your domain and dmarc@acme.example with a working address that can receive the reports. None requests no quarantine or rejection on the basis of DMARC failure. Other spam and malware filters still operate.
If you already have DMARC, update that one record. Keep an existing quarantine or reject policy when adding or changing rua; don't lower it just to collect reports. Don't publish a second DMARC record.
Once you've verified legitimate senders, alignment, and forwarding effects, and decided reject suits the domain's purpose, the same record can become:
_dmarc.acme.example TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@acme.example"Make that decision from evidence about your legitimate email, rather than a fixed deadline. If the reporting address is on another domain, the receiving domain may also need a DNS authorization record. See the DMARC setup guide for configuration and the RUA report guide for reading the results.
Bring the reports together in Genharden DMARC
RUA reports arrive as XML files, rather than a table designed for people to read. Gmail may be only one source; files from Outlook, Yahoo Mail, and other receivers add to the work of comparing senders, counts, and results over time.
Genharden DMARC brings the RUA reports you receive from Gmail, Outlook, Yahoo Mail, and other services into one place, with senders, message counts, and authentication results together. You can use that view to review your sending services and check what changes after an authentication fix. When using Genharden, put the dedicated RUA address issued by the service in rua instead of the fictional reporting address above.
Keep the website warning. Encourage customers to verify unusual invoices or bank account changes through a contact they already know. Add sender authentication and a DMARC policy so receiving servers can consider your request, too. For an initial look at your public DNS settings, use the domain check.
The same approach lets you request quarantine or rejection from Outlook.com, Yahoo Mail, and other services that support DMARC. Actual handling and reporting coverage vary by receiver. Your notice informs readers; your DMARC policy communicates with the server receiving the email.
Genharden DMARC · Updated 2026-11-17. Based on the SPF, DKIM and DMARC standards and the official documentation linked above. Companies, domains, IP addresses and report figures are illustrative unless stated otherwise.